Abstract. In many applications, where encrypted traffic flows from an open (public) domain to a protected (private) domain, there exists a gateway that bridges the two domains and faithfully forwards the incoming traffic to the receiver. We observe that indistinguishability against (adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA), which is a mandatory goal in face of active attacks in a public domain, can be essentially relaxed to indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) for ciphertexts once they pass the gateway that acts as an IND-CCA/CPA filter by first checking the validity of an incoming IND-CCA ciphertext, then transforming it (if valid) into an IND-CPA ciphertext, and forwarding the latter to the recipient in the private domain. "Non-trivial filtering" can result in reduced decryption costs on the receivers' side. We identify a class of encryption schemes with publicly verifiable ciphertexts that admit generic constructions of (non-trivial) IND-CCA/CPA filters. These schemes are characterized by existence of public algorithms that can distinguish between valid and invalid ciphertexts. To this end, we formally define (non-trivial) public verifiability of ciphertexts for general encryption schemes, key encapsulation mechanisms, and hybrid encryption schemes, encompassing public-key, identity-based, and tagbased encryption flavours. We further analyze the security impact of public verifiability and discuss generic transformations and concrete constructions that enjoy this property.
Introduction
Transmission of sensitive information over public networks necessitates the use of cryptographic protection. Modern cryptography offers various techniques, including public key encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE), by which the sender can use public information to encrypt a message only the intended receiver can decrypt. These two encryption flavours can be combined into a common syntax, called general encryption (GE) [1] , and for longer messages, IND-CCA/CPA Filtering and Its Applications. Consider an intermediate party, called a gateway, and assume that encrypted sender's messages are transmitted over a public network until they reach the gateway and are then forwarded by the gateway over a private network to the receiver, with the gateway being trusted by the receiver to forward faithfully.
By the above reasoning, IND-CCA security would be required for the encrypted traffic from (possibly malicious) senders towards the gateway. But for messages on the internal network -including from the gateway to the receiver -IND-CPA security would be sufficient in practice to preserve confidentiality. If the gateway just forwards all (IND-CCA) ciphertexts from the outside world without modification, all security goals remain satisfied, but perhaps we can improve efficiency for the receiver by having the gateway do some processing on ciphertexts before forwarding them.
An often observed difference between IND-CPA and IND-CCA schemes is that IND-CPA schemes successfully decrypt every given ciphertext, whereas the majority of IND-CCA schemes typically check ciphertexts for consistency and decrypt only those that are "well-formed" [8, 10, 16, 17, 18] . For such schemes the gateway could act as a filter that would sort out inconsistent IND-CCA ciphertexts. There exist few IND-CCA schemes [4, 24, 25] , that decrypt every ciphertext to a possibly meaningless (random) message. Such schemes are not well-suited to filtering since the gateway would need to know the receiver's private key to decide whether the message is meaningful, which would in general be unacceptable since it requires trusting gateways for confidentiality, not just integrity.
In this paper, we are interested in solutions that allow an honest-but-curious gateway to transform IND-CCA-secure traffic from a public network into IND-CPAsecure traffic for a private network at low cost and while fully preserving confidentiality of encrypted messages; the key step is that the gateway is trusted to correctly perform a "validity check" of traffic from the public network before forwarding it on to the private network. Recipient devices on the private network can then use a more efficient decryption procedure.
Many real applications could benefit from this "sender-gateway-receiver" scenario: for example, sensor networks often consist of many low-powered nodes that communicate with each other locally and which use a single more powerful gateway device to communicate with the Internet. To protect their local communications, nodes may have shared keys with the sink which they use in highly efficient symmetric key algorithms, only needing to resort to more expensive asymmetric algorithms when communicating with the outside world. In our paradigm, the gateway could take IND-CCA-secure traffic from senders in the outside world, check it for validity, and convert it to a simpler (IND-CPA-secure) format to reduce the processing costs for receiving sensor nodes. As a second example, mail servers (MTAs) generally receive emails over unprotected networks, whereas email recipients typically contact these servers to access their emails after having established an end-to-end authenticated (and possibly encrypted) channel with them. Hence, for encrypted emails or attachments, the mail server could perform a "sanity check" and filter out inconsistent ciphertexts, saving the client from their local processing.
Ciphertext Consistency Checks. IND-CCA-secure schemes where inconsistent ciphertexts can be filtered out based on consistency checks seem very suitable for our purposes. Consistency checks can be either private or public: the check is private if it requires at least partial knowledge of the private key (e.g. in [10] ), while public checks do not require any secrets (e.g. in [8, 16] ).
We will focus on IND-CCA-secure cryptosystems with publicly verifiable ciphertexts. Interestingly, public verifiability has been treated so-far in a rather folklore manner, e.g. as a property of concrete schemes, e.g. [8, 16, 18, 17] . To make use of this property in general, for example to enable "black-box" constructions of higher-level security protocols from publicly verifiable encryption schemes, a more formal and thorough characterization of public verifiability is merited. We also note that public verifiability has been extensively addressed in a different context, namely with regard to threshold encryption, where as observed initially in [19] and then provably realized in [31, 8, 7, 21] , this property is useful to make the threshold decryption process of an IND-CCA-secure threshold encryption scheme non-interactive and robust.
In our applications, public verifiability can immediately be used to detect and filter out invalid IND-CCA ciphertexts, i.e. by trusting the gateway to perform the check. This filtering could also be performed for IND-CCA schemes with private consistency checks, as long as these checks need only parts of the private key that are by themselves not sufficient to break IND-CPA security. Existence of such IND-CCA schemes has been demonstrated by Persiano [26] through his concept of trapdoor cryptosystems. For instance, he proved that a trapdoor containing private-key components in Cramer-Shoup PKE [10] that are used in the consistency check cannot be used for an IND-CPA attack (although their disclosure allows malleability attacks). Being concerned about IND-CCA-security, Persiano argued that existence of such trapdoors is a drawback. Taking a look at trapdoor cryptosystems in [26] from the perspective of our work, we observe that the gateway could indeed be given trapdoor information to check IND-CCA consistency without losing IND-CPA security. However, this approach would offer somewhat weaker guarantees in contrast to publicly verifiable schemes: if the delegated trapdoor keys are ever leaked, then IND-CCA security can never be recovered. This contrasts with our approach, in which the receiver always has the potential to obtain IND-CCA security at any particular time simply by performing more operations.
Contributions. We formalize the property of publicly verifiable ciphertexts for general encryption, general KEMs, and general KEM/DEM hybrid schemes. Our definitions emphasize the role of public ciphertext consistency checks within the decryption procedure. In our approach, decryption algorithms of publicly verifiable schemes follow a strictly modular design where the consistency check can be performed independently of the remaining "lightweight" decryption procedure. Success or failure of the entire decryption procedure is indicated by the consistency check, which can be performed by any third party without access to any secret information. The only exception is the KEM/DEM approach, where we relax these conditions to account for decryption failures in the DEM part. Our definitions employ the syntax of generalized encryption by Abdalla et al. [1] which we extend to also capture tag-based encryption (TBE) [3, 16] and to address KEMs and the KEM/DEM framework.
With these definitions, we first prove the very general statement that any IND-CCA-secure scheme with publicly verifiable ciphertexts remains at least IND-CPA-secure if the underlying consistency check is outsourced from the decryption procedure. In some sense, this gives us the trivial and well-known result that any IND-CCA-secure ciphertext can be publicly converted into a ciphertext that still guarantees basic IND-CPA protection (since every IND-CCA-secure scheme is also IND-CPA-secure). However, the notion of public verifiability is particular interesting in the case where the verification algorithm is strictly nontrivial -the public consistency check fails exactly when the IND-CCA-secure scheme's decryption algorithm fails -as such publicly verifiable schemes can readily be used to build the aforementioned IND-CCA/CPA filters.
We provide several constructions (general and concrete) of IND-CCA-secure schemes with strictly non-trivial publicly verifiability. In addition to existing schemes, e.g. [8, 16, 18, 17] , for which public verifiability was discussed informally, we first show that two well-known general ways for obtaining IND-CCA secure schemes offer public verifiability (although not strictly non-trivial public verifiability), namely the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transform [9] and the NIZKbased transform [28, 22] . The result on CHK contrasts with the related transform by Boneh and Katz [6] that uses a message authentication code (MAC) and does not offer public verifiability. We present a concrete PKE scheme, obtained through a tweak on the KEM of Kiltz [17] , that offers an especially lightweight decryption procedure for ciphertexts that passed its strictly non-trivial public verification. In addition to PKE we consider KEMs and give examples of public key-based, identity-based, and tag-based KEMs with strictly non-trivial public verification. Finally, we look into the KEM/DEM paradigm and show that strictly non-trivial public verification of the KEM partially carries over to the hybrid scheme -namely, we define a somewhat non-trivial public verification for hybrid encryption schemes by linking a failure in the hybrid decryption process to a verification failure in either the KEM or the DEM, and show that by outsourcing KEM consistency check the hybrid construction remains at least IND-CPA-secure.
Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts in General Encryption

Definition: General Encryption
A general encryption (GE) scheme GE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) consists of four algorithms:
The parameter generation algorithm PG takes input a security parameter 1 k , k ≥ 0, and returns public parameters par and a master secret key msk. Public parameters include a description of the identity space IDSp, the message space MsgSp, and the tag space TagSp. KG(par, msk, id): On input par, msk, and id ∈ IDSp, the key generation algorithm KG produces an encryption key ek and decryption key dk. Enc(par, ek, M, t): On input par, ek, a message M ∈ MsgSp, and a tag t ∈ TagSp, the encryption algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext C. Dec(par, ek, dk, C, t): On input par, ek, dk, C, and a tag t, the deterministic decryption algorithm Dec returns either a plaintext message M or ⊥ to indicate that it rejects.
This GE formalism encompasses public-key, identity-based, and tag-based encryption schemes:
PKE: Set msk = and assume that IDSp and TagSp contain a single fixed element that can be omitted as implicit input to the algorithms. IBE: Consider KG that on input id outputs ek = id and assume that TagSp contains again a single fixed element that can be omitted as implicit input to the algorithms. TBE: Set msk = and assume that IDSp contains again a single fixed element that can be omitted as implicit input to the algorithms.
, and all tags t ∈ TagSp, we have Dec(par, ek, dk, Enc( par, ek, M, t), t) = M with probability one, where the probability is taken over the coins of Enc.
Indistinguishability. The IND-CCA/CPA security games between a challenger and an adversary A are defined by the experiments in Figure 1 (left column). The advantage of A in those games is defined as
where xxx ∈ {CPA, CCA}. A GE scheme is IND-xxx-secure if the advantage of any PPT adversary A in the corresponding game is negligible in the security parameter k. 
General Encryption with Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts
In our definition of general encryption with publicly verifiable ciphertexts we require existence of a separate algorithm for ciphertext validation and that the scheme's original decryption procedure can be logically divided into this public validation check followed by a lightweight decryption algorithm.
Definition 1 (Publicly Verifiable GE).
A general encryption scheme GE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) is said to be publicly verifiable with respect to auxiliary algorithms Ver and Dec if Dec(par, ek, dk, C, t) has the same input/output behavior as the following sequence of operations:
where Ver and Dec satisfy the following:
Ver(par, ek, C, t): Given public parameters par, the encryption key ek, a ciphertext C, and a tag t, this algorithm outputs either ⊥ if the ciphertext fails the validation or a (transformed) ciphertext C . Note that Ver does not take any secrets as input. Dec (par, ek, dk, C , t): This deterministic algorithm takes input public parameters par, encryption and decryption keys (ek, dk), a ciphertext C , and a tag t, and outputs a message M or ⊥.
Hereafter, when we say Dec = Dec • Ver we mean that Dec can be decomposed into two algorithms Ver and Dec according to the above construction. Note that all IND-CCA-secure general encryption schemes trivially achieve public verifiability with respect to Ver(par, ek, C, t) := C and Dec := Dec. We are often interested in the case where something non-trivial is occurring in Ver, i.e. where the consistency check is essential for successful decryption. Note that this separation does not formally ensure that Dec is more efficient than Dec, though in practice we are of course interested primarily in such schemes.
Definition 2 (Strictly Non-Trivial Public Verification). Let GE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) be a general encryption scheme that is publicly verifiable with respect to auxiliary algorithms Ver and Dec . Let (par, msk) ← PG(1 k ). Ver is said to be strictly non-trivial if, for all id ∈ IDSp, all t ∈ TagSp, and (ek, dk) ← KG(par, msk, id), 1. Ver(par, ek, C, t) = ⊥ ⇔ Dec(par, ek, dk, C, t) = ⊥ for all C, and 2. there exists a ciphertext C for which Dec(par, ek, dk, C, t) = ⊥.
Condition 1 requires that successful public verification is both necessary and sufficient for the decryption algorithm not to fail. Condition 2 formally excludes IND-CCA-secure schemes where Dec never outputs ⊥ (e.g. [24, 25, 4] where modified (challenge) ciphertexts decrypt to random messages) to capture the intuition that in order to determine whether C carries some meaningful message one must have at least partial knowledge of the private key (which contradicts the goals of strictly non-trivial public verification).
Theorem 1 (proven in Appendix A) shows that any IND-CCA-secure GE scheme with publicly verifiable ciphertexts remains at least IND-CPA-secure if its decryption algorithm Dec is replaced with Dec . In the original decryption procedure a strictly non-trivial verification process may syntactically modify the ciphertext. For syntactical reasons we must ensure that ciphertexts output by the encryption algorithm of the new scheme can be processed with Dec . This is achieved via post-processing of original ciphertexts using Ver and by viewing this step as part of the new encryption algorithm. Theorem 1. Let GE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) be an IND-CCA-secure general encryption scheme that is publicly verifiable with respect to
(k), where B has (asymptotically) the same running time as A.
Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts through CHK Transformation
Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [9] described an method for constructing an IND-CCAsecure public key encryption scheme PKE from any IND-CPA-secure identitybased encryption scheme IBE with identity-space {0, 1} s(k) and any strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme OTS = (KG, Sign, Vrfy) with the verification key space {0, 1} s(k) (see [9] for the syntax of OTS and the details of the original CHK transform; note that one-time signature schemes can be constructed from any one-way function [27] ). Later, Kiltz [16] showed that CHK transform works also if the IND-CPA-secure IBE scheme is replaced by a weakly IND-CCA-secure tag-based encryption scheme TBE with tag-space {0, 1} s(k) . Figure 2 (which uses GE notation) shows that in both cases, the resulting PKE is public verification with respect to PKE.Ver and PKE.Dec , but importantly the public verification is not strictly non-trivial: the IBE or TBE decryption operation may still fail. In the IBE-based case ek = remains empty while dk = msk and par are output by IBE.PG. In the TBE-based case ek and dk are output by TBE.KG using par generated by TBE.PG. Original IBE-based transform from [9] and its TBE-based version from [16] are obtained using PKE.Dec = PKE.Dec • PKE.Ver. 
Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts using NIZKs
An IND-CPA-secure public key encryption scheme PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) can be converted into an IND-CCA-secure one using a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof (P, V ) with simulation soundness, as proven by Sahai [28] based on the Naor-Yung approach [22] . The private/public key pair of the resulting scheme PKE is given by (dk, ek) = ((dk 1 , dk 2 ), (ek 1 , ek 2 , ρ)) where (dk i , ek i ), i ∈ {1, 2}, are obtained from two independent runs of PKE .KG and ρ is the common reference string of the NIZK proof system for languages of the form (c 1 , c 2 , ek 1 , ek 2 ) satisfying c 1 = PKE .Enc(par, ek 1 , M ) ∧ c 2 = PKE .Enc(par, ek 2 , M ) where M (and implicitly random coins used in the encryption process) play the role of the witness. As demonstrated in Figure 3 , IND-CCA schemes output by this transformation offer public verifiability, though not strictly non-trivial public verifiability as the PKE .Dec operation in PKE.Dec may output ⊥. This reasoning also applies to the NIZK-based constructions from [12] and to the first IND-CCA-secure PKE scheme by Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [11] that uses NIZK-proofs in a slightly different way. Although NIZK-based schemes are regarded as not efficient, we notice that their lightweight decryption procedure Dec (if the scheme is viewed from the public verifiability perspective) is as efficient as that of CHK-based schemes in Figure 2 .
PKE.Enc(par, ek, M ) :
PKE.Ver(par, ek, C) :
PKE.Dec (par, ek, dk, C ) :
Fig. 3. PKE with Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts from NIZK-based Transformation
Our PKE Scheme with Strictly Non-Trivial Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts
In this section, we propose a practical IND-CCA-secure PKE scheme, whose public verification is strictly non-trivial and is well-suited for IND-CCA/CPA filters described in the introduction due to an especially light algorithm Dec . Our construction is inspired by the IND-CCA public-key KEM of Kiltz [17] , which when plugged into a KEM/DEM framework would yield an IND-CCAsecure PKE scheme (but loose strictly non-trivial public verification as discussed in Section 4). In contrast, we obtain strictly non-trivial publicly verifiable PKE in a more direct way, by using the encapsulated key in [17] as a one-time pad for the message and by linking the resulting ciphertext components together with a one-time signature, whose verification key is in turn bound to the KEM ciphertext part through a tweak on the original scheme from [17] . Our scheme provides strictly non-trivial public verifiability, unlike the schemes presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 based on the CHK and NIZK transformations.
The scheme. Our PG algorithm is similar to [17] except that it uses gap groups: PG(1 k ) outputs public parameters par = (G, p, g, DDH, H) where G = g is a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, 2 k < p < 2 k+1 , DDH is an efficient
is a cryptographic hash function such that 1 (k) is a polynomial in k. We also use a strong one-time signature scheme OTS = (KG, Sign, Vrfy) with verification key space {0, 1} 2(k) such that 2 (k) is a polynomial in k and a target collision resistant hash function TCR : G × {0, 1} 2(k) → Z p . The message space is MsgSp = {0, 1} 1(k) . The scheme works as shown in Figure 4 .
PKE.KG(par) :
PKE.Dec (par, ek, dk, C ) : Security Analysis. First we give intuition why our scheme is IND-CCA-secure. Let (c * , σ * , vk * ) be the challenge ciphertext. As we discussed above, without the CHK transform, the proposed PKE can be seen as a KEM/DEM combination which is at least IND-CPA-secure due to Herranz et al. [14] . As for the KEM, the Hashed Diffie-Hellman (HDH) assumption [2] can be used to prove the IND-CPA security of the resulting PKE. Note that the message does not depend on vk * , and σ * is just the signature on c * . Therefore c * being an output of the IND-CPAsecure scheme hides the value of the chosen b from the adversary.
We now claim that the IND-CCA adversary A may access decryption oracle but gains no help in guessing the value of b. Suppose the adversary submits a ciphertext (c , σ , vk ) = (c * , σ * , vk * ) to the decryption oracle. Now there are two cases: (a) vk = vk * or (b) vk = vk * . When vk = vk * , the decryption oracle will output ⊥ as the adversary fails to break the underlying strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme with respect to vk . When vk = vk * , the attacker B against the HDH problem can set the public keys as seen in the IND-CCA security proof for the KEM by Kiltz [17] such that (1) B can answer except for the challenge ciphertext all decryption queries from A even without the knowledge of the secret key and (2) B solves HDH if A wins. This security is captured by the following theorem, which is proven in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Assume that TCR is a target collision resistant hash function and OTS is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. Under the Hashed Diffie-Hellman assumption for G and H, the PKE scheme (PKE.KG, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec = PKE.Dec • PKE.Ver) based on Figure 4 is IND-CCA-secure.
Efficiency. Our PKE scheme in Figure 4 is more efficient than previous schemes with public consistency checks. In our scheme, public keys consist of 2 group elements, the ciphertext overhead is 2 group elements, a one-time signature and a one-time verification key, encryption requires 3.5 group exponentiations (using simultaneous exponentiation) and 1 one-time signature, verification requires 1 group exponentiation, 2 pairings, and 1 one-time signature verification, and lightweight decryption requires only one exponentiation.
Amongst existing PKE constructions with public consistency checks, only two seem to offer the same efficiency for lightweight decryption: Kiltz [17] describes a (direct) PKE construction (in addition to KEM) that is publicly verifiable with the same lightweight decryption cost of 1 group exponentiation, but at the cost of requiring public keys with the number of group elements being linear in the security parameter, as opposed to only 2 group elements in the public key of our scheme. Hanaoka and Kurosawa [13] describe a publicly verifiable KEM that, when combined with a DEM, would yield a (somewhat non-trivial, cf. Section 4) publicly verifiable PKE. Its lightweight decryption would require 1 group exponentiation (plus any costs from the DEM) but its public keys would contain 3 group elements, compared to 2 group elements in our scheme.
Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts in General KEMs
Definition: General KEM
A general key encapsulation mechanism (GKEM) is a tuple GKEM = (PG, KG, Encap, Decap) of four algorithms such that PG and KG have the same syntax as in case of general encryption (cf. Section 2.1) except that message space is replaced with the key space KeySp, whereas the syntax of Encap and Decap matches that of Enc and Dec, respectively, with the only difference that Encap outputs a ciphertext C and a session key K ∈ KeySp, while Decap outputs either K or ⊥.
GKEM correctness and adversarial advantage Adv
IND-xxx
A,GKEM (k), xxx ∈ {CPA, CCA} in indistinguishability experiments from Figure 1 are also defined analogously to the case of general encryption.
General KEMs with Public Verifiable Ciphertexts
Definition 3 (Publicly Verifiable GKEM). A general key encapsulation mechanism GKEM = (PG, KG, Encap, Decap) is said to be publicly verifiable with respect to auxiliary algorithms Ver and Decap if Decap = Decap • Ver where Ver and Decap satisfy the following:
Ver(par, ek, C, t): Given public parameters par, the encryption key ek, a ciphertext C, and a tag t, this algorithm outputs either ⊥ if the ciphertext fails the validation, or a (transformed) ciphertext C . Note that Ver does not take any secrets as input. Decap (par, ek, dk, C , t): This deterministic algorithm takes input public parameters par, encryption and decryption keys (ek, dk), a ciphertext C , and a tag t, and outputs a key K.
Since all IND-CCA-secure general GKEMs trivially achieve public verifiability with respect to Ver(par, ek, C, t) := C and Decap := Decap we can reuse Definition 2 for GKEMs to define their strictly non-trivial public verification.
Theorem 3 (whose proof is identical to that of Theorem 1 and is omitted here) shows that any publicly verifiable IND-CCA-secure GKEM scheme will remain at least IND-CPA-secure if the verification algorithm Ver is run by an honest-but-curious gateway. To account for a non-trivial verification process that may modify the ciphertext, we again apply post-processing to the output of the encapsulation algorithm (cf. Section 2.2). 
Constructions of Strictly Non-Trivial Publicly Verifiable KEMs
We now present some examples for KEMs with publicly verifiable ciphertexts. First, we discuss the publicly verifiable construction of an identity-based KEM that we obtain immediately from the IND-CCA-secure IB-KEM proposed by Kiltz and Galindo [18] . Parameters par = (G 1 , G T , p, g, e, H) chosen by parameter generation algorithm PG(1 k ), k ∈ Z ≥0 , are such that G 1 is a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p : 2 2k < p, G T is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order, g is a random generator of G 1 , e : G 1 × G 1 → G T is a nondegenerate bilinear map, and H : {0, 1}
(k) → G 1 is a random hash function such that (k) is a polynomial in k. We also use a target collision resistant function TCR : G 1 → Z p . Figure 5 details the scheme.
Note that by defining KEM.Decap = KEM.Decap • KEM.Ver we immediately obtain the original Kiltz-Galindo IB-KEM [18] . It is easy to see that its public verification algorithm KEM.Ver is strictly non-trivial. Further, Kiltz and Galindo noted that ignoring all operations associated to the identity in their IB-KEM yields a simplified version of the IND-CCA-secure public-key schemes from [8, 16] . Therefore, by removing computations related to the ciphertext component c 2 and the key generation algorithm KG from Kiltz-Galindo's IB-KEM, we immediately obtain publicly verifiable constructions of a public-key KEM and a tag-based KEM with strictly non-trivial public verification.
1. Generate par = (G1, GT , p, g, e, H)
KEM.Encap(par, id) :
KEM.KG(par, msk, id) :
1. Parse (par , pk) ← par and par
KEM.Ver(par, pk, id, C) : 
Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts in Hybrid Encryption
Since its invention, the KEM/DEM approach [10, 29] , being very simple and flexible, has become popular and part of several encryption standards [15, 23, 30] . It has been shown that if both the KEM and the DEM are secure against chosenciphertext attacks, then so is the resulting hybrid encryption scheme [10] . Herranz et al. [14] studied necessary and sufficient security conditions for KEMs and DEMs in relation with the security of the hybrid construction. They showed that for the IND-CCA-security of the hybrid scheme, the KEM must be IND-CCAsecure while the security requirement on the DEM can be relaxed from IND-CCA to IND-OTCCA that prevents one-time (adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Therefore, when dealing with public verifiability of hybrid schemes we must take into account existence of consistency checks in the decryption of DEM (in addition to checks for the KEM part). Since DEM consistency checks are performed using the decapsulated key, hybrid schemes cannot provide strictly non-trivial public verification from Definition 2. We show, however, that these schemes can offer a somewhat relaxed property, where public verifiability refers only to the KEM part, meaning that successful public consistency check of the KEM part is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the overall success of decryption. In the context of gateway-assisted IND-CCA/CPA conversion this property effectively allows to outsource the consistency check of the KEM part to the gateway. In this way clients would only need to perform private consistency checks for the DEM part, which means negligible costs in comparison to the verification costs for KEMs.
2. there exists a ciphertext C for which Dec(par, ek, dk, C, t) = ⊥.
Condition 1 requires that successful public verification is necessary but not sufficient for the decryption algorithm to successfully decrypt. In particular, if Ver succeeds then the only reason why HGE.Dec fails is because of a failure in DEM.Dec. Condition 2 remains as in Definition 2.
Theorem 4 (proven in Appendix C) shows that if the underlying general KEM is publicly verifiable with strictly non-trivial verification then the hybrid general encryption scheme is publicly verifiable in the somewhat non-trivial way and that by outsourcing verification of the KEM part the hybrid scheme remains at least IND-CPA-secure.
Theorem 4. Let GKEM = (PG, KG, Encap, Decap) be an IND-CCA-secure general key encapsulation mechanism that is publicly verifiable with respect to GKEM. Ver and GKEM.Decap , DEM = (Enc, Dec) be an IND-OTCCA-secure data encapsulation mechanism, and HGE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) be the resulting hybrid general encryption scheme.
1. If GKEM.Ver is strictly non-trivial then HGE is publicly verifiable with respect to a somewhat non-trivial HGE.Ver and an algorithm HGE.Dec . 
Constructions of Hybrid Encryption with Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts
Herranz et al. [14] showed that if some IND-CCA-secure KEM is combined with an IND-OTCCA-secure DEM then the resulting hybrid encryption scheme is also IND-CCA-secure. As shown by Cramer and Shoup [10] , one can easily construct an IND-OTCCA-secure DEM by adding a one-time MAC to a one-time-secure DEM such as one-time pad. Moreover, Theorem 4 states that if the underlying KEM is publicly verifiable then the resulting hybrid encryption scheme is publicly verifiable as well. We can thus immediately obtain a range of publicly verifiable constructions of hybrid encryption schemes with somewhat non-trivial verification from these two building blocks; for instance, we can apply publicly verifiable KEM constructions from Section 3.3.
In the case of tag-based KEM/DEM approach, Abe et al. [3] showed that IND-CCA-secure hybrid encryption can be obtained by combining an IND-CCAsecure tag-based KEM with a one-time secure DEM. They also provide constructions of IND-CCA-secure tag-based KEMs that they obtain generically from IND-CCA-secure public-key KEMs and one-time MACs. Our publicly verifiable public-key-based KEM constructions from Section 3.3 can be used to instantiate their tag-based KEMs, resulting in further publicly verifiable hybrid encryption schemes.
Conclusion
In this work we formalized the notion of public verifiability for encryption schemes, KEMs, and hybrid KEM/DEM constructions. By adopting and extending the generalized syntax from [1] our definitions of publicly verifiable schemes and corresponding security results hold for public-key based, identity-based, and tag-based settings. We defined conditions under which public verifiability can be seen as a non-trivial requirement for IND-CCA security and have proven that by outsourcing verification those schemes remain at least IND-CPA secure. We showcased that well-known CHK and NIZK-based transforms offer strictly nontrivial public verification, proposed a new PKE scheme that makes most use of this property, and discussed different flavours of efficient strictly non-trivial publicly verifiable KEMs. With regard to hybrid schemes we showed that although strictly non-trivial verification is not achievable, a relaxed notion of somewhat non-trivial public verifiability can be obtained, which still offers sufficient performance gains in IND-CCA/CPA filters that are useful for applications where outsourcing of ciphertext verification to an honest-but-curios gateway without losing confidentiality is sufficient for practical purposes.
B Proof of Theorem 2
